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The characteristic of insurance sector determines that insurance markets are typical 
information markets where exists multi-layer information risk. Especially in the 
period that the insurance markets of our country are immature, all kinds of problems 
causing by information risk have affected the efficiency of insurance markets badly 
and have threatened the healthy and orderly development of insurance sector. 
Taking the information economics as the theory support and the game theory as the 
studying tool, the dissertation conducts series research on information risk between 
insurers and policy-holders, insurers and insurance intermediaries, and government 
and insurers. Then it brings out some mechanism designs by models to control 
information risk. 
The dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, relying on the study of the 
connotation of information and risk, it defines the concept of information risk and 
does some research on the relevant theory. In Chapter 2, it summarizes the 
information risk in insurance markets, and analyzes the traits and entities of 
information risk in insurance markets. Chapter 3 to Chapter 5 is the outspread part of 
the dissertation. In these chapters, the author respectively conducts series research on 
information risk and its control of the three pairs in insurance markets, that is, insurers 
and policy-holders, insurers and insurance intermediaries, government and insurers. It 
studies not only general subjects but also specific subjects, and tries to give some 
useful ideas to market players (such as insurers and policy-holders) as well as to 
relevant regulatory authorities to control information risk.  
The innovations of the dissertation are listed below: (1) It brings out the broad 
sense definition and narrow sense definition of information risk basing on the research 
on concepts and theories of information and risk. (2) Differing from the past study just 
focusing on the moral hazard and adverse selection between insurers and 
policy-holders, it extends the study scope to the information relationship between 
insurers and insurance intermediaries, and government and insurers. (3)It tries to 
fractionize moral hazard into moral hazard with bad-meaning and moral hazard with 
good-meaning, because the two parts have big difference in the cause of formation, 
characters and risk control. (4)It initiates to analyze the behavior of insurance agents 













principal supervision. (5) It tries to define some kinds of insurances with certain 
characters of “semi-public product” as “semi-public insurance”, such as agriculture 
insurance, endowment insurance and third party liability insurance on mobile car. 
Based on that, it uses game theory to study what kinds of incentive measures the 
government would take to stimulate the underwriters running this kind of insurance to 
provide the semi-public product to society in the efficient way. 
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